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This article asks whether competition can ameliorate the consequences of cognitive error.
Consumers differ cognitively, some being more prone to err (the “naive”) than others (the
“sophisticated”). Competition among firms is analyzed with a search equilibrium model. Firms
offer an exploitative contract or a naive contract to a consumer population partitioned in
two ways: some consumers are sophisticated while others are naive, and some consumers
search for preferred contracts while others visit one firm. There are two principal results. First,
when consumers shop, neither contract type is priced monopolistically, and competitive pricing
sometimes obtains. Second, when enough consumers are sophisticated and the naive have a
relatively low willingness to pay for their preferred contract, exploitative contracts decline
in frequency and may actually vanish. These results suggest that while decision makers should
continue to ask if consumers suffer from cognitive error, they also should ask whether markets
do, or could be helped to, ameliorate error’s consequences.
1. INTRODUCTION
1.1. Consumer Heterogeneity regarding Cognitive Error
This article asks whether market competition can ameliorate the effect
of cognitive error. Much of the policy literature asks the converse ques-
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tion, how the presence of cognitive error affects market performance.
This literature makes a homogeneity assumption. Persons (all of them)
are assumed to make particular cognitive mistakes, or no one does.
Consequently, in contexts where mistakes are thought to be made, reg-
ulation in some form seems warranted.
This belief may be overstated because the homogeneity assumption
is inaccurate. Psychologists believe that an experimental subject succeeds
when she makes the choice that maximizes her overall well-being. This
choice is denoted the “normative response.” A nontrivial fraction of
subjects in psychological experiments give the normative response.
This heterogeneity result arises because persons process information
with one or the other of two distinct systems. “System 1 is viewed as
encompassing primarily the processes of interactional intelligence. It is
automatic, largely unconscious, and relatively undemanding of com-
putational capacity. . . . [I]t conjoins properties of automaticity and
heuristic processing. . . . System 2 conjoins the various characteristics
that have been viewed as typifying controlled processing. System 2 en-
compasses the processes of analytic intelligence that have traditionally
been studied in psychometric work and that have been examined by
information-processing theorists trying to uncover the computational
components underlying psychometric intelligence” (Stanovich 1999, p.
204).1
Cognitive theory experiments are designed such that one information-
processing system will yield a particular response but the other will yield
a different response. The experimenter’s goal is to see which system
governs how subjects perform the experimental task. For example, the
scenarios used in framing problems intuitively seem different to sub-
jects—the system 1 result—but analysis would show that the scenarios
actually describe the same problem—the system 2 result. Subjects whose
behavior is controlled by system 2 are not misled by how the question
is posed. Subjects whose behavior is controlled by system 1 make errors.
1. See also Strack, Werth, and Deutch (2004, p. 222): “Social behavior is the effect of
two distinct systems of information processing: a reflective system and an impulsive system.
. . . In the reflective system, . . . knowledge about the value and probability of potential
consequences is weighed and integrated to reach a preference for one behavioral op-
tion. . . . In contrast, the impulsive system activates behavioral schemata through spread-
ing activation, which may originate from perceptual input or from reflective processes.”
See also Kahneman (2003, pp. 1451–52): “[T]he intuitive operations of System 1 generate
impressions of the attributes of . . . thought. . . . In contrast, judgments are always ex-
plicit and intentional, whether or not they are overtly expressed. Thus, System 2 is involved
in all judgments, whether they originate in impressions or in deliberate reasoning.”
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The data also show that performance on one laboratory task correlates
positively with performance on others: subjects who make mistakes in
one context tend to make them in other contexts.2
The correlation in performance across experiments is plausible. Sub-
jects who give the normative response in an experiment score higher in
intelligence, as measured by SAT scores, than do subjects who fail to
give the normative response, and the former subjects also test higher on
such personal traits as a tendency to intellectualize problems (Rydval
and Ortmann 2004; Stanovich and West 2000). Since intelligence and
personality are relatively invariant to context, smart, intellectual people
make fewer mistakes in general than other persons.3 Also, persons do
not come to the experimenter wearing signs that identify themselves as
analytic or intuitive. Rather, when a psychology investigator is interested
in who is who, she tests subjects ex post.
The psychology results suggest that markets possess two features
relevant to the question asked here. First, market participants also should
be heterogenous: there will be “system 2 persons,” who are difficult to
fool, and “system 1 persons,” who are more easily misled.4 Second, in
mass transactions, as in the experiments, it will often be difficult for
2. Stanovich’s extensive review summarizes the studies (1999, p. 66): “[T]he direction
of all of the correlations displayed in Tables 2.1 and 2.2 is consistent with the standard
normative models used by psychologists when interpreting tasks in the reasoning and
decision-making literature. Individuals giving the normative response in one task tended
to give it on another—even when the task requirements were quite different. Also, in every
single case, cognitive ability was positively associated with giving the normative response—
individuals of higher intelligence were relatively more likely to give the normative response.
This was equally true for tasks where the normative response is the subject of great con-
troversy as it was for the relatively uncontroversial tasks.” A recent recognition in the
literature that heterogeneity is the more defensible assumption is by Rachlinski (2006). In
the same vein, “many households find adequate solutions to the complex investment prob-
lems they face, [but] some households make serious investment mistakes” (Campbell 2006,
p. 1590).
3. Chiappe and MacDonald (2005, p. 20), summarizing studies, state, “There is evi-
dence that people with higher g [the score for general intelligence] are better able to reason
logically on a wide variety of tasks, including those in which people are prone to the
systematic biases resulting from the radical contextualization characteristic of human
thinking.”
4. There are a few real-world examples. Agarwal et al. (2008) found that 60 percent
of the consumers in their sample chose the credit card contract that minimized their total
interest costs, while 40 percent did not. The probability of making the wrong choice declined
with the dollar magnitude of the potential error. Agnew (2006, p. 940) found that “higher
salaried employees tend to make significantly better [401(k)] choices,” while other em-
ployees follow naive investment strategies. Yang, Markoczy, and Qi (2007) found that
some consumers in credit card markets are excessively optimistic about their ability to
make timely repayments, while others are not.
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sellers and lenders to identify who is who before the firm offers contracts
to consumers.
Firms thus face a complex problem. A firm would like to present a
deal in such a fashion as to cue the system 1 response if consumers
exhibiting that response would accept less favorable terms than would
more analytical consumers. For example, persons are said to be overly
optimistic about their future earnings prospects. Such persons may for-
mulate financial plans that entail the willingness to accept lending con-
tracts with low interest rates but harsh terms—for example, a term
requiring the consumer to mortgage important assets—because they un-
derestimate the probability of default. A firm that offers such contracts
to everyone, however, could lose the business of system 2 persons (their
financial plans would cause them to reject agreements with such harsh
terms). Since firms compete for the marginal consumer, and sometimes
will not know her type, competition among firms for the sophisticated,
if there are enough of such persons, could cause firms to ignore the
preferences of the naive.
It will be helpful, in pursuing this possibility, to divide unsophisticated
consumers into two categories: those who know their flaws and those
who do not. To see the point of this distinction, suppose that many
consumers discount the future hyperbolically rather than exponentially.
A hyperbolic discounter has a higher discount rate between tomorrow
and today than she has between 6 and 5 months from today.5 Now
consider a person who in January resolves that for the next year she
will not spend more than $200 each month above the amount required
to satisfy her basic needs. In March, however, an MP3 player looks great
to her. The consumer thus is at risk of being time inconsistent. In January,
she would like to restrict her discretionary spending in the coming
March, but when March arrives she may overconsume. Consumers who
are aware of such present-based preferences may prefer to precommit
not to spend excessively. Therefore, the market is more likely to offer
5. Considerable evidence exists that persons become more impatient as their payoffs
move closer in time. The phrase “hyperbolic discounting” has become a shorthand for this
type of behavior. Whether persons actually discount hyperbolically—whether their discount
rates vary inversely with the time when payoffs are to be received—is becoming contro-
versial. A good review is Frederick, Lowenstein, and O’Donaghue (2002). Shui and Ausubel
(2005) find some evidence of hyperbolic discounting in credit card markets. For recent
theoretical explanations of excessively present-based behavior, see Dasgupta and Maskin
(2005) and al-Nowaihi and Dhami (2006).
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“naive contracts” to consumers who are unaware of their penchant to
err.
1.2. Identifying Naive Contracts
An analyst testing this supposition must know what a naive or an ir-
rational contract is, but no widely acceptable definition exists. To un-
derstand the definition used below, realize that a consumer may make
two distinct mistakes: she can misconceive her type or misconceive the
contract that would suit her type. A consumer misconceives her type
when she is more optimistic, more confident, more present oriented,
more swayed by anecdotal evidence than she should be. A consumer
misconceives the contract when she correctly apprehends her type but
prefers a contract that is inappropriate for that type. Cognitive error
more frequently presents as a type mistake, and limited cognitive ca-
pacity more frequently presents as a contract mistake. This article is
concerned with cognitive error, so the analysis below focuses on type
mistakes. In this world, when the consumer buys a contract that ap-
propriately matches her type, the contract is “sophisticated.” A naive
contract reflects a mismatch.
To make this definition a little more precise, suppose that contracts
differ in quality, where quality is a function of the consequences that
attach to breach either by the firm or by the consumer. As examples, a
contract with a broad warranty is of higher quality than a contract with
a narrow warranty because the broad warranty affords the consumer
more relief when the seller breaches. A lending agreement with a narrow
security interest (or none) is of higher quality than an agreement with
a broad security interest because default is less costly to the consumer
when she can keep more of her property. Now let a consumer’s circum-
stances be such that she would purchase a warranty of quality qh if she
knew the true odds of defects, unless qh carried a very high price. The
consumer’s search reveals the qh warranty and a lower quality warranty,
ql, both of which are priced competitively. The sophisticated version of
this consumer, who knows the odds, would pay the price premium for
the high-quality warranty qh, while the naive version of this consumer
(she is optimistic regarding the defect probability) would purchase the
lower quality but lower priced warranty ql. The lower quality warranty
reflects a mismatch between the consumer’s type and her contract
choice.6
6. A broader definition would define a mismatch as the choice of a nonmaximizing
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The analysis below supposes for convenience that consumers are in
similar circumstances and come in two types: sophisticated and naive.
Contracts come in two qualities: high (for example, the broad warranty)
and low. Firms specialize in selling either high- or low-quality contracts.
Whenever a consumer purchases a contract that is more favorable than
her type would justify, the situation would qualify as a mismatch, but
more severe consequences can visit consumers who mismatch on the low
side. Accordingly, low-quality contracts (that is, narrow warranties) are
denoted naive in the analysis below because they are more likely than
high-quality contracts to reflect disadvantageous mismatches resulting
from cognitive mistakes. High-quality contracts are denoted sophisti-
cated because they are less likely to reflect such unfortunate mismatches.
A naive consumer may nevertheless buy the qh warranty if it is priced
much below the low-quality warranty; similarly, a sophisticated con-
sumer may rationally purchase the ql warranty if qh is monopolistically
priced. Thus, equilibria may exist in which both contract types trade.7
Banning contracts that are described here as naive seems unwise. The
assumption that all consumers are in similar circumstances is strong.
When it is relaxed, some consumers (perhaps they are cash constrained)
may rationally prefer to gamble with a narrow warranty. Another reg-
ulatory strategy would be to identify the naive and regulate what they
buy, but this has obvious difficulties. A third strategy would be to correct
the possibly applicable biases themselves. Section 4.3 will argue that this
strategy is wise for schools but not for other institutions.
1.3. This Article
This article pursues a fourth strategy: it takes consumers as they are and
asks whether markets can help the naive. Market competition could
cause firms to respond to cognitive error in three nice ways: (a) to offer
contracts that sophisticated consumers prefer to all consumers, (b) to
offer contracts to self-aware error-prone persons to permit these con-
sumers to avoid serious trouble, or (c) to offer naive contracts but to
contract. For example, a consumer who expected to borrow a lot would be better off with
a credit card contract that had an introductory fee and a low annual rate, while a consumer
who expected to borrow a little would do better with a contract that had no introductory
fee and a high annual rate. A consumer who incorrectly believes she will borrow little, in
consequence of optimism about her prospects, is mismatched if she chooses the contract
with an introductory fee. The text focuses on utility-minimizing contracts in the breach
context because they have attracted much of the policy attention.
7. The prices at which consumers will purchase their less preferred contracts are pre-
cisely defined in the model below.
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price them competitively, so that inefficiencies are second order. The
question whether actual markets respond in any of these ways poses
theoretical and empirical issues. Regarding theory, the analysis must be
more concrete. How does competition work when some consumers are
fully rational and others are not?8 Regarding empirics, does competition
work in the ways that theory suggests?
This article takes a theoretical tack. Section 2 creates a search equi-
librium model of competition among firms for naive and sophisticated
consumers.9 The model addresses two issues: (a) how competition affects
the price at which naive contracts are sold and (b) how competition
affects the mix of naive and sophisticated contracts the market offers.
Section 3 shows that, under plausible conditions, competitive markets
will reduce the prices of naive contracts and sometimes will drive naive
contracts out altogether.10 The conclusion (Section 4) summarizes the
results and discusses their normative implications.
A serious normative question should be raised at the outset: is it
desirable for competition to drive out contracts intended for the naive?
This result would be unfortunate if the normative goal were the maxi-
mization of persons’ actual preferences, for the preferences of the naive
would have been frustrated. A full normative analysis of what markets
should do is outside this article’s scope, but the conclusion will briefly
argue that society should want markets to implement the consumer’s
ideal preferences—the preferences she would have were she sophisti-
cated—rather than her actual preferences. If this argument persuades,
8. A Coasian analysis would take a broader focus, to ask when cognitive error is best
corrected within firms or on markets. Market analysis regarding cognitive error is so
undeveloped that it seems productive at this stage to pursue a market inquiry separately.
9. A search model analyzes competition for search goods, which are goods all of whose
features the buyer can observe before purchase. Color thus is a search good, while durability
is an experience good. This article uses a search model because it is interested in the
contracts consumers sign, and a contract, at least in theory, can be read before the consumer
commits to buy.
10. DellaVigna and Malmendier (2004) show that a monopolist will offer utility-
maximizing contracts to sophisticated and to error-prone but self-aware consumers, but
the monopolist will exploit the naive. They obtain the same results in the competitive case
when competition is perfect. Perfect competition, however, requires consumers to have zero
search costs: that is, the consumer can costlessly compare the contracts that every firm in
the market offers. The analysis below asks how markets perform under the more realistic
assumption that it is costly for consumers to search.
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then markets that respond more to the sophisticated than to the naive
are performing well.11
2. A SEARCH MODEL
2.1. Consumer Types
Each consumer buys one contract, which is associated with the purchase
of a product or the incurring of a financial obligation, or the consumer
does not transact. Consumers are partitioned in two ways. First, some
consumers do not make errors or do but are aware of their failings.
Both consumer types are denoted “sophisticated” because they can cor-
rectly match their type to the contracts they buy. Other consumers are
in objective circumstances similar to those of the sophisticated consumers
but make errors. These consumers, however, are unaware of their pen-
chant to err and so are denoted “naive”; they are more likely than the
sophisticated consumers to buy mismatched contracts. There are Bs so-
phisticated consumers in the market and Bn naive consumers, where
, the total number of consumers. Consumers also are par-B B p Bs n
titioned according to their shopping behavior. The nonshoppers—B1 in
number consumers—visit one firm before purchasing. The shoppers—
B2 in number consumers—visit two firms and then purchase the most
11. Akerlof and Yellen (1985, p. 712) make a conjecture that anticipates the results
reached here regarding the possible efficacy of markets. They show that while irrational
behavior sometimes can have large effects, it is “easy to envision cases in which nonmax-
imizing behavior by a significant fraction of the population would have only a minor effect
on the equilibrium of the system. . . . Suppose, for example, that a significant minority
of rational market participants regards two goods or assets as perfect substitutes at a given
price ratio; the opinions of such agents is [sic] apt to dictate the market outcome even in
the presence of a substantial fraction of irrational or nonmaximizing agents. Financial
markets provide the obvious example.” Kluger and Wyatt (2004, p. 995) tested this con-
jecture by creating a simple double auction market for a security in which the subjects’
particular cognitive error is not to update probabilities according to Bayes’s law when
given new information. They found that when all subjects made this error, the market
outcome was inefficient. “However, when markets are made up of both rational (no judg-
ment error) and biased traders, we find the outcome is reversed. . . . Competition
among . . . bias-free subjects is sufficient to drive prices to correct levels despite the pres-
ence of twice as many subjects who exhibit probability judgment errors.” This article asks
whether competition has similar positive effects in consumer markets for goods or credit.
More recently, Garcı´a, Sangiorgi, and Urosˇevic´ (2007) argue that in financial markets prices
will be set as if all agents are rational, although a positive fraction of agents are naive.
This is because, in their model, rational agents adjust their information acquisition strategies
to take account of the optimists’ behavior.
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attractive of the two contracts they see.12 A sample size of two is chosen
for convenience.
Naive and sophisticated consumers apparently have similar prefer-
ences for low prices; both consumer types are assumed to search with
the same probability P.13 The number of naive shoppers—PBn—is de-
noted bns, and the number of naive nonshoppers— —is denoted(1P)Bn
bn. Similarly, there are bss sophisticated shoppers and bs sophisticated
nonshoppers.
2.2. Contracts and the Information Structure
A contract is a set of terms that define a consumer purchase. A firm can
sell a high-quality contract, denoted Xs, or a low-quality contract, de-
noted Xn. The high-quality contract is intended for the sophisticated
consumers because they are more likely than the naive consumers to
recognize that the contract is appropriate for their type. The low-quality
contract is intended for the naive consumers, whom cognitive bias can
cause to make mismatches.14 At the beginning of a period, the firm
12. Using a nonsequential search—with a fixed sample size—is an attractive strategy
for several reasons. First, it is optimal when the outcome of the search is observed with
delay. For example, people often apply for several jobs at once rather than apply for a job
and then apply for another only after rejection. Albrecht, Gautier, and Vroman (2006)
develop a search equilibrium model to analyze labor markets in which job applicants make
a fixed number of applications. Further, when there are fixed costs to shop, it often is best
to visit a shopping district, thereby spreading the cost over several store visits. Finally, a
fixed sample size search is attractive to risk-averse consumers who do not know the com-
plete price distribution in a market. Using a sequential search in this circumstance may
cause consumers to stop searching too soon (they see prices they consider to be low and
buy even though there are lower prices) or to stop searching too late (they see prices they
consider to be high and continue searching for nonexistent lower prices). The danger of
searching too little seems more likely (Einav 2005; Sonnemans 1998).
13. The assumption that all consumers search with the same probability is consistent
with results showing that the principal determinant of search intensity in search theory
experiments is search costs (Grether, Schwartz, and Wilde 1992).
14. Contracts are assumed to be independent, in the strict sense that the consumers’
choice of the naive contract does not affect the payoffs of consumers who choose the
sophisticated contract. As an example of how this assumption could be violated, let a
lender offer a mortgage with an attractive refinancing option that sophisticated consumers
will use optimally (that is, when rates drop substantially) but naive consumers will underuse.
The naive consumers’ failure to refinance at favorable rates creates a cross subsidy from
the naive to the sophisticated. The existence of this subsidy, in turn, could cause sophis-
ticated consumers to reject contract innovations that would benefit everyone but dissipate
the subsidy. A similar effect occurs when firms offer a base product and later offer an add-
on. The willingness of naive consumers to pay monopoly prices for the add-on permits
firms to offer the base good at cost or less. The sophisticated consumers benefit by sub-
stituting away from the add-on while paying the low price for the base good (Gabaix and
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chooses which type of contract to offer and what price to charge. The
firm then knows the naive/sophisticated consumer distribution and the
shopper/nonshopper distribution. After a period—a “shopping sea-
son”—ends, the firm can revise its contracting strategy. The model below
considers only one period.
A firm has no occasion to alter its strategy during a period because,
it is assumed, whether a particular consumer is naive or sophisticated,
or is a shopper or not, is private information. Regarding the private-
information assumption, in mass transactions firms cannot distinguish
consumers by their analytical ability or penchant to think hard about
problems. Also, the relation between easily available demographic data
and the presence of bias in particular persons is crude. For example, the
evidence now does not support such claims as that consumers who make
$100,000 per year are less likely to discount hyperbolically than are
consumers who make $50,000 a year. Similarly, consumers’ susceptibility
to framing effects is invariant to age (Ronnlund et al. 2005).15 Finally,
parties do not bargain in the model, so a firm cannot conveniently learn
whether consumers who visit it have visited another firm or plan to shop
further.
2.3. Costs and Prices
There are Y total firms in the market, where Ys sell the sophisticated
contract Xs and Yn sell the naive contract Xn ( , the totalY Y p Ys n
number of firms). Each firm has fixed costs Fi (i p s or n), produces at
a constant marginal cost of ci over some range {0, zi}, and produces at
an infinite marginal cost thereafter (zi thus is the firm’s capacity con-
straint). The average cost of offering a contract is ,AC(X )p (F /q) ci i i
where q is output. The competitive price, which has each firm pricing
contracts at an average cost and selling up to capacity, thus is ∗p pi
. There is free entry, so in equilibrium firms earnAC (X )(z )p (F /z ) ci i i i i i
zero profits, and no firm can increase its expected profits by changing
its price or the type of contract it offers.
Laibson 2006). Few consumer contracts have been identified, however, that permit the
kinds of cross subsidization described in this footnote. The independence assumption thus
should not materially bias the results reached here.
15. Agarwal et al. (2006, p. 10) report that “the pattern of results [in their credit card
study] is broadly similar across the wealthy versus non-wealthy accounts.” The assumption
that consumer types are private information is a domain assumption. The model does not
apply when a firm can learn, on a person-to-person basis, which consumers are naive and
which are not. A firm that knows this information will offer exploitative contracts to the
naive.
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Contracting costs are assumed to increase with contract quality (that
is, it costs the firm more to offer a broad warranty than to offer a narrow
warranty). More particularly, the marginal cost of selling contracts is
assumed not to vary by contract type: . The assumptions thatc p c p cn s
contracting costs are increasing in quality and that marginal costs are
the same imply that the fixed costs of offering the high-quality contract
exceed the fixed costs of offering the low-quality contract. Consequently,
the competitive price of the sophisticated contract— —exceeds the∗ps
competitive price of the naive contract— . The fixed-cost assumption∗pn
is plausible but may be too general. The implications of relaxing it are
considered in Section 3.3.
2.4. Willingness to Pay and Consumer Preferences
A consumer is said to prefer a contract if she would choose it after seeing
both contracts selling at their competitive prices. To understand this
concept of a preference, let a sophisticated consumer purchase the con-
tract intended for her, Xs, at any price up to a common limit price for
sophisticated consumers of ls. A consumer will purchase her less pre-
ferred contract if the price of her preferred contract is too high. The
sophisticated consumer thus will purchase the contract intended for na-
ive consumers, Xn, at any price up to a common limit price of lsn. So-
phisticated consumers are assumed to have a greater willingness to pay
for the sophisticated contract than for the naive contract ( ). If thel 1 ls sn
same reasoning is used, a naive consumer will purchase Xn at any price
up to a common limit price for naive consumers of ln and will purchase
Xs at any price up to a common limit of lns, where . A sophisticatedl 1 ln ns
consumer also is assumed to have a lower willingness to pay for the
naive contract than the naive consumer has ( ). Similarly, for naivel ! lsn n
consumers, . These limit prices are referred to as the consumers’l ! lns s
willingness to pay for contract types.
A consumer who sees both contracts will purchase the contract for
which her marginal willingness to pay exceeds her marginal cost. To see
what is meant, note that the naive consumer would derive a surplus of
if she purchased Xn at its competitive price and a surplus of
∗l  pn n
if she purchased Xs when it is priced competitively. If the terms
∗l  pns s
are rearranged, this consumer will buy Xn if , where the
∗ ∗l  l 1 p  pn ns n s
left-hand side of this inequality is the consumer’s marginal willingness
to pay for the naive contract and the right-hand side is her additional
marginal cost. The left-hand side is positive and the right-hand side is
negative, so the inequality always is satisfied. The naive consumer thus
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will purchase Xn if she sees both contracts priced competitively.
16 If the
same logic is used, the sophisticated consumer would purchase the so-
phisticated contract if she saw both contracts priced competitively and
. Both sides of this inequality are positive, so the in-∗ ∗l  l 1 p  ps sn s n
equality may not always hold. A sophisticated consumer who only
weakly preferred the sophisticated contract would purchase the com-
petitively priced naive contract if the fixed costs of selling that contract
were much below the fixed costs of selling the sophisticated contract.
The combination of a weak willingness to pay for a contract and rel-
atively high fixed costs to create and administer it seems uncommon.
Therefore, the sophisticated consumer is assumed to prefer Xs when she
sees both contracts priced competitively.
2.5. Switching between Contracts
In the model, consumers sometimes will purchase their less preferred
contract. To see precisely when, consider a naive consumer. She is as-
sumed to reject the naive contract Xn when it is priced such that she
would earn at least as much surplus by purchasing Xs at its competitive
price. The noncompetitive price for Xn that satisfies this condition is the
switching price. If this price is denoted , a naive consumer whop (a)n
observes both contract types will buy the sophisticated contract when
. The left-hand side of this inequality is the naive∗l  p x l  p (a)ns s n n
consumer’s surplus from purchasing Xs when it is priced competitively;
the right-hand side is the surplus from purchasing Xn at the switching
price. Letting this expression be an equality and rearranging terms yields
the switching price that would induce naive consumers to buy sophis-
ticated contracts: . The price at which a sophisticated∗p (a)p l  l  pn n ns s
consumer would switch to Xn— —is derived similarly.p (a)s
This analysis suggests that the degree of exploitation a market can
sustain is decreasing in consumer sophistication. For example, consumers
may make fewer mistakes regarding the warranty term than regarding
the prepayment penalty term because consumers experience product de-
16. This result follows from assuming that the naive consumer has a greater willingness
to pay for the contract intended for her than for the contract intended for the sophisticated
consumer, and the fixed costs of offering sophisticated contracts exceed the fixed costs of
offering naive contracts.
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fects more commonly than they prepay loans.17 The less naive a consumer
is, the greater will be her willingness to pay for a sophisticated contract;
she will (partly) recognize that contract’s virtues. Formally, lns will ap-
proach ln, so will be close to the competitive price for Xn of . In
∗p (a) pn n
turn, when is low, firms that price Xn noncompetitively risk losingp (a)n
the business of naive shoppers.
2.6. The Firm’s Comparative Advantage
A firm is said to have a comparative advantage at selling a contract type
if the firm needs fewer customers to break even—to recover its fixed
costs—selling that contract type at its limit price than selling the other
type at its limit price. A firm breaks even at the limit when its net revenue
on sales equals its fixed costs: that is, when , where l is thel (l  c)p Fi i i
number of customers the firm expects to have when it prices at the limit.
If the terms are rearranged,
Fi
l p .i l  ci
Thus, a firm would have a comparative advantage, denoted ls, at selling
the sophisticated contract Xs if
F Fs n
l p ! l p .s nl  c l  cs s n n
As will become apparent, when firms have a comparative advantage at




The heuristic is to assume that firms sell only the naive contract priced
competitively and then to ask whether this equilibrium is robust to de-
17. Some biases moderate with experience. For example, Van den Steen (2004,
p. 1141) states that the overconfidence “bias also increases in a mean-preserving spread
of the distribution of prior beliefs, but it tends to disappear with sufficient experience with
the particular choice problem.” Agarwal et al. (2008) show that the likelihood that a
consumer will pay a late fee under a credit card contract falls if the consumer has paid a
late fee in the past, and Agarwal et al. (2006, p. 5) find that consumers “who made larger
errors in their initial [credit card] contract choice were more likely subsequently to switch
to the optimal contract.” Also, experience substantially improves peoples’ ability to do
Baysian reasoning (Harrison 1994; Camerer 1990).
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viations. Two related factors influence a firm’s decision to deviate in the
price dimension. First, the firm will trade off the increased revenue from
a supracompetitive price against the reduction in demand from consum-
ers who shop. Second, the firm must recover its fixed costs; the higher
these are, the more customers the firm needs to break even, so the more
difficult it is to sustain high prices. The demand and fixed-cost factors
imply that three prices can exist in equilibrium:
i. Xn at : This is the competitive equilibrium price.
∗pn
ii. Xn at lsn: This is the sophisticated consumer’s willingness to pay
for the naive contract.
iii. Xn at ln: This is the limit price for the naive contract.
A firm that deviated to the limit price would sell only to naive non-
shoppers. The naive shoppers would see the contract Xn selling elsewhere
at its competitive price and buy it. The deviant firm would not sell to
sophisticated shoppers. They would also see Xn priced at , which is
∗pn
below the price for the naive contract that will induce a sophisticated
consumer to switch.18 The firm also would not sell to sophisticated non-
shoppers because they have a lower willingness to pay for the naive
contract than the naive consumers have (that is, ). Therefore, onlyl ! lsn n
naive nonshoppers would purchase Xn at its limit price of ln.
The firm would not deviate from the competitive equilibrium if a
deviation would earn it a nonpositive profit. This equilibrium condition
is expressed as
bn(l  c)  F X 0.n nY
The first term on the left-hand side of this expression is the surplus the
firm would earn from the deviation (limit price less marginal cost) times
the expected demand from naive nonshoppers. The expression can be
written as
b Fn n
X p l . (1)nY l  cn
A deviation to the highest price for the naive contract thus would not
occur if naive consumers comparison shop (bn is low) and if the firm
has a relatively low comparative advantage at offering the naive contract
(ln is high). To understand the second condition, note that the firm would
18. To show this, the price that would induce the sophisticated consumer to switch to
Xn is . That implies that .
∗ ∗p (a)p l  l  p l 1 l p ! p (a)s s sn n s sn n s
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have a low comparative advantage if naive consumers have a low will-
ingness to pay for the naive contract (ln is low) or if the fixed costs of
selling exploitative contracts are high (Fn is high). The firm gains less
from charging the limit price when the limit is low, and the firm needs
more naive nonshoppers to recover its fixed costs when those costs are
high.
No deviation to prices between ln and lsn, the limit price of a so-
phisticated consumer for the naive contract, would be profitable. At any
such price, only naive nonshoppers would purchase. Since the firm could
sell to these consumers at the higher ln price, the firm would either charge
the limit if that deviation were profitable or consider deviating to lsn.
The firm would then sell to both types of nonshoppers but would not
sell to any shoppers; both shopping types would prefer Xn at to Xn
∗pn
at lsn.




Y (l  c)sn
The left-hand side of equation (2) is larger than the left-hand side of
equation (1), which implies that this deviation is more likely. However,
, so the right-hand side of equation (2) is larger than the right-l ! lsn n
hand side of equation (1). If sophisticated consumers have a low will-
ingness to pay for naive contracts (lsn is small), then the demand effect
will dominate: the firm will have too few customers to recover its fixed
costs when it charges lsn.
No deviation to prices between lsn and would be profitable. To see
∗pn
why, consider a deviation to a price q where . The firm would∗p ! q ! ln sn
continue to sell to both types of nonshoppers at price q, but the shoppers
would see Xn at and buy it. Thus, the deviation would not increase
∗pn
the firm’s demand but would reduce its profit per sale. This logic applies
to any price in the interval between lsn and .
∗pn
Two or more of these equilibrium prices could coexist. The analysis
has asked whether a single firm would deviate from a competitive equi-
librium that has Xn sold at . A firm that deviates to the limit of ln
∗pn
would sell only to naive nonshoppers. There may be enough of them to
sustain deviations by a subset of firms but not by all. Similarly, a firm
that deviates to lns would sell only to nonshoppers, and there may not
be enough of them to sustain this deviation by every firm. In such cases,
19. A shopper who would buy Xn at lsn would prefer to buy Xn at any lower price.
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there will be price dispersion in equilibrium: two or three prices could
coexist.20
The analysis of the firm’s pricing decision can be summarized in this
way:
Proposition 1. When every firm sells the naive contract Xn, three
equilibrium prices are possible: (i) , the competitive price, (ii) lsn, the∗pn
limit price of sophisticated consumers for the naive contract, and (iii) ln,
the limit price of naive consumers for the naive contract.
Remark 1. Deviations to noncompetitive prices are less likely if (a)
the ratio of sophisticated consumers to total consumers is high, (b) the
willingness of sophisticated consumers to pay for naive contracts is low,
(c) the willingness of naive consumers to pay for naive contracts is low,
(d) the ratio of shoppers to total consumers is high, and (e) the fixed costs
of offering naive contracts are high. The presence of sophisticated con-
sumers helps the naive in two ways. First, some sophisticated consumers
shop. Second, sophisticated consumers have a lower willingness to pay
for the naive contract than the naive consumers have. Both factors exert
a downward pressure on the prices firms can charge for Xn.
Remark 2. Competition is beneficial in two ways. First, competition
will ameliorate or eliminate the redistribution of wealth from consumers
to firms. The lower that firms are forced to price Xn, the greater is the
surplus consumers realize from buying it. Second, when firms earn rents
from noncompetitive pricing, new firms will enter the market to compete
for those rents. As a consequence, though all firms come to earn zero pure
profits, the market will have too many firms. This inefficiency is reduced
as market pricing becomes more competitive because then fewer firms will
20. Two price equilibria were shown to exist in the well-known Salop and Stiglitz
(1977) search model. Experimental evidence confirming predictions of search models that
price dispersion exists in equilibrium when goods are homogenous but not all consumers
are informed is in Morgan, Orzen, and Sefton (2006), Cason and Datta (2006), and Grether,
Schwartz, and Wilde (1992). Also, Kim, Dunn, and Mumy (2005) test a credit card model
in which all consumers are rational and some search more than others. They found that
the searchers obtained lower interest rates. The extent to which the credit card market
today is competitive is controversial. Ausubel (1991) argued that the market was noncom-
petitive because, using 1980s data, interest rates on credit cards were relatively insensitive
to banks’ cost of funds. More recent data show that this sensitivity has increased sub-
stantially (Brown and Plache 2006, p. 78). However, adverse selection makes it difficult
for consumers with high credit card balances to switch to firms offering better rates, though
this effect has moderated in recent years (Calem, Gordy, and Mester 2006). This article
takes no position on the competitiveness of particular markets.
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enter. Finally, the model assumes for convenience that consumers engage
in the minimum amount of search; shoppers visit only two firms. If con-
sumers search more extensively, the beneficial effects of competition would
be enhanced.
Remark 3. The ideal, among legal scholars, is the “dickered term”:
the portion of the agreement whose content is codetermined. Dickering
has less appeal in consumer markets if firms can use the bargaining process
to learn whether consumers are naive and whether they shop. Such firms
could then offer exploitative contracts to the naive and the less diligent.
In contrast, in the model here the selling side chooses every term, but
firms cannot identify particular consumers by type. Proposition 1 thus
suggests that consumers can be better off with anonymity plus competition
than with the opportunity to bargain with firms over terms.
3.2. Contracting Decisions
The next issue is whether the competitive equilibrium of Xn at is
∗pn
robust to deviations by firms offering the sophisticated contract Xs. Such
a firm would sell to a different customer mix, but it would also face the
same trade-off between higher profits per sale and the consequent re-
duction in demand. Again, three prices for Xs can exist in equilibrium:
i. Xs at : This is the competitive price for Xs.
∗ps
ii. Xs at lns: This is naive consumers’ willingness to pay for the so-
phisticated contract.
iii. Xs at ls: This is the limit price for Xs.
A firm that deviated to ls would serve only sophisticated nonshoppers.
The firm would not sell to naive shoppers because their other draw would
be from a firm selling Xn priced competitively. The firm also would not
sell to naive nonshoppers because their willingness to pay for the so-
phisticated contract is less than the willingness to pay of sophisticated
consumers for that contract (that is, ). Finally, the firm would notl ! lns s
sell to sophisticated shoppers because their other draw also would be
from a firm selling Xn at , which is below the sophisticated consumer’s
∗pn
switching price. If the logic above is used, a deviation from selling the
naive contract at to selling the sophisticated contract at its limit price∗pn
would earn nonpositive profits if
b Fs s
X X l . (3)sY l  cs
An equilibrium in which some firms sold Xn at ln while other firms
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sold Xs at ls would not exist if firms would earn negative profits selling
Xn at ln but would earn positive profits selling Xs at ls. To see when this
could occur, compare equations (1) and (3). The fixed costs of selling
the sophisticated contract are assumed to exceed the fixed costs of selling
the naive contract ( ). Therefore, equation (3) could be violatedF 1 Fs n
(deviations to Xs at its limit would be profitable), but equation (1) could
be satisfied if there are sufficiently more sophisticated nonshoppers than
naive nonshoppers or if the sophisticated consumers had a sufficiently
greater willingness to pay for the contract intended for them than the
naive consumers had for the contract intended for them.
No deviation to any price in the interval between ls and lns would be
profitable. The deviant firm would sell only to sophisticated nonshoppers
at any such price, and it could do better selling to them at ls. If the firm
deviated to lns, the willingness to pay of a naive consumer for the so-
phisticated contract, the firm would sell to every nonshopper who visited




Y l  cns
An intermediate contract quality deviation would be unique when firms
sell Xs at lns but do not sell Xn at lsn. The left-hand side of equations (2)
and (4) are identical (only nonshoppers are customers for intermediate
deviations). As a consequence, the assumption that will precludeF ! Fn s
this equilibrium unless naive consumers are sufficiently more willing to
pay for sophisticated contracts than sophisticated consumers are willing
to pay for naive contracts (that is, if lns were sufficiently greater than
lsn).
The firm would only sell to nonshoppers at any price in the interval
between lns and . The firm thus would either charge the higher lns price
∗ps
or deviate downward to the competitive price. At , the firm would sell∗ps
to every sophisticated consumer who visits it. Sophisticated nonshoppers
would buy Xs because it is below their limit price. Sophisticated shoppers
would buy Xs because their other draw would be from a firm selling Xn
at , and each consumer type prefers the contract intended for her when∗pn
both contracts are priced competitively. The firm would also sell to naive
nonshoppers who visit it because is below the switching price for∗ps
these consumers of . The firm would not sell to naive shoppersp (a)n
because they would also see Xn at its competitive price. Therefore, the
set of firms offering Xn at shrinks as the ratio of sophisticated con-
∗pn
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sumers to total consumers and the ratio of shoppers to nonshoppers
both increase. It is possible for no or few firms to offer the naive contract
even though there are naive customers for it.
This analysis of contracting decisions is summarized in the following:
Proposition 2. Competition can cause equilibria to vanish in which
firms sell only naive contracts. In such cases, either the market will offer
both contract types or only sophisticated contracts will trade. The “good”
outcomes are more likely to occur when firms have a comparative ad-
vantage at selling sophisticated contracts. They also are more likely to
occur if there are relatively many sophisticated consumers, if consumers
of both types often shop, and if naive consumers have a relatively high
willingness to pay for sophisticated contracts.
Remark 4. The analysis asked whether deviations to the sophisticated
contract were possible when every firm is pricing the naive contract com-
petitively. Deviations are more likely when firms price Xn monopolistically.
If a substantial number of sophisticated nonshoppers are present, firms
would do better selling Xs at lns than selling Xn at ln unless the fixed costs
of selling the sophisticated contract greatly exceeded the fixed costs of
selling the naive contract or the willingness of naive consumers to pay for
sophisticated contracts was quite low.21
Remark 5. Proposition 2 is a possibility result. Competition can re-
duce the fraction of naive contracts and sometimes eliminate them. Prop-
osition 2 thus should be taken to tell decision makers to investigate the
status of particular markets before intervening on the ground that cog-
nitive error exists.
Remark 6. A number of biases, such as overconfidence and the en-
dowment effect (List 2003), moderate with experience. This fact suggests
that naivete is less common or weaker in markets in which consumers
buy or borrow frequently. The less naive a consumer is, the lower is her
willingness to pay for the naive contract and the higher is her willingness
21. If equations (1) and (4) are compared, firms would do better selling Xs at lns than
Xn at ln when . The term B1 is the total number of non-[B (l  c) b (l  c)] /Y 1 F  F1 ns n n s n
shoppers, while bn is the total number of naive nonshoppers. When there are a substantial
number of sophisticated nonshoppers, B1 will be much larger than bn. Therefore, firms
would do better selling Xs than Xn when the fixed costs are close or when the willingness
to pay of the groups is close.
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to pay for the sophisticated contract. Common transactions thus are less
likely to be conducted under naive contracts than are rare transactions.
3.3. Revisiting Fixed Costs
This article assumes that the marginal costs of selling contract types are
equal and that the firm’s contracting cost is increasing in contract quality.
These assumptions imply that the fixed costs of selling the sophisticated
contract exceed the fixed costs of selling the naive contract. Reversing
the fixed-cost assumption thus would imply that contract cost is de-
creasing in contract quality. If this is so, the market is more likely to
offer both contract types or only the sophisticated contract. Intuitively,
when Xn is priced at or above Xs, a consumer who sees both contracts
will buy Xs. The sophisticated consumer prefers Xs and the naive con-
sumer prefers a higher to a lower quality contract when the higher quality
contract has a lower price. For example, a consumer who incorrectly
thinks she needs a narrow warranty would buy a broad warranty if the
marginal premium were zero or negative. This intuition underlies the
fact that if , firms are more likely to have a comparative advantageF ! Fs n
at selling the sophisticated contract. When the comparative advantage
runs in this direction, deviations from equilibria in which every firm
offers Xn to equilibria in which some, or all, firms offer Xs will be more
common (see proposition 2). Thus, it is worth asking whether the fixed
costs of selling sophisticated contracts always exceed the fixed costs of
selling naive contracts.
The fixed costs of selling a contract are primarily the costs of creating
a system to administer it, and these costs could vary inversely with a
contract’s quality. Some low-quality contracts truncate consumers’ post-
purchase contact with the firm relative to high-quality contracts of the
same type; other low-quality contracts expand the consumers’ postpur-
chase contact with the firm relative to sophisticated contracts of the
same type. As examples, a low-quality warranty contract truncates post-
purchase contact relative to a high-quality warranty contract. The less
the warranty covers, the fewer are the claims consumers can make. Thus,
the fixed costs of creating a system to respond to warranty claims should
be higher when the firm makes a broad warranty than when it makes
a narrow warranty. In the former case, the firm must be prepared to
adjudicate a nontrivial number of claims and to repair or replace de-
fective items. In the latter case, the firm will tell many consumers to go
away. Hence, higher quality warranty contracts have higher fixed costs
than do lower quality warranty contracts.
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Low-quality debt contracts expand postpurchase contact relative to
high-quality debt contracts, however. Low-quality debt contracts—naive
contracts—are disproportionally sold to consumers in relatively disad-
vantageous economic circumstances and contain harsh default terms,
such as broad security interests and high late fees. Firms that sell low-
quality debt contracts thus are likely to have extensive postloan contacts
with their borrowers: to dun or sue them, to repossess, to participate in
a bankruptcy. Firms that sell high-quality debt contracts will usually just
process payments. Thus, the lower the quality of a debt contract, the
greater will be the fixed costs of selling it. The warranty transaction
illustrates a contract that is truncating, while the lending transaction
illustrates a contract that is expanding. The reasoning here suggests that
is more likely for truncating contracts and is more likelyF 1 F F ! Fs n s n
for expanding contracts. As a consequence, there may be a higher social
payoff to regulating warranty markets on cognitive-error grounds than
to regulating credit markets on those grounds.
This conclusion should be tentatively held. The preliminary analysis
here is meant only to show that a firm’s contracting costs may sometimes
decrease with the quality of the contracts it offers. Contract regulation
thus should be sensitive to context.
4. CONCLUSION
4.1. Summary
Market populations commonly are heterogenous. Some consumers are
sophisticated; they either do not make cognitive errors or are error prone
but self-aware. Other consumers are naive; they are error prone but
think they are not. When firms compete, contracts intended for the
naive—naive contracts—may still exist, but they are unlikely to be sold
at supracompetitive prices. Also, some firms will offer contracts intended
for the sophisticated. The likelihood that markets will generate nor-
matively desirable outcomes is increasing in the number of sophisticated
consumers, the penchant of both sophisticated and naive consumers to
search for the contracts they like, sophisticated consumers’ willingness
to pay for sophisticated contracts, and the lower the fixed costs are of
creating sophisticated contracts relative to the fixed costs of creating
naive contracts. Good outcomes also are more likely when naive con-
sumers have a low willingness to pay for contracts intended for them
and a consequent relatively high willingness to pay for the sophisticated
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contracts. Pathological cases are possible in which only naive contracts
are traded though sophisticated consumers exist, but there also are plau-
sible cases in which both contract types, or only the sophisticated type,
are traded.
4.2. Normative Issues
Increasing the difficulty of purchasing naive contracts or driving them
out altogether are morally problematic options. If naive consumers do
not lose their errors, they must experience welfare losses when com-
petition causes their preferred contracts to disappear.22 There are two
arguments, briefly sketched here, that these losses should not count. The
first argument is in a Rawlsian vein and goes like this: Consider a person
who initially knows only that she will be a consumer during her adult
life. She is then told to assume the following: (a) when she is to make
market purchases, she may be naive regarding some or all transactions,
or she may be sophisticated regarding some or all transactions; (b) when
she is sophisticated, she will purchase the sophisticated contract, if given
a choice, because that contract would maximize her expected monetary
return; and (c) her consumption choices affect only herself. Assumption
b implies that she would have more lifetime wealth if she turned out to
be sophisticated than if she turned out to be naive. Assumption c implies
that she could not benefit other naive consumers if she herself turned
out to be naive or chose to act as if she were. The three assumptions
taken together thus imply that the consumer would prefer the market
to respond only to sophisticated preferences.
As to the realism of the last two assumptions, sophisticated contracts
generally maximize a consumer’s expected wealth relative to naive con-
tracts. Thus, the right debt contract reduces the consumer’s bankruptcy
risk while the wrong one may increase it, and the right warranty contract
reduces the risk that the consumer will have to pay the full price for a
defective product while the wrong warranty contract leaves that risk
relatively untouched. Assumption b thus seems correct. Assumption c
also holds because, in the mass markets considered here, a consumer’s
choice of a naive contract would not materially increase the availability
22. This is a familiar problem in utilitarian theory. Williams (1985, p. 88) thus argued
that government can reduce utility if it implements idealized preferences but persons never
come to have those preferences.
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of that contract for other consumers. Markets, that is, restrict the effect
of pursuing altruistic preferences to the expression of opinion.23
Original position arguments rest on the premise that persons in the
original position are relevantly alike. The argument here rests on the
same premise. It supposes everyone to prefer more to less, ceteris paribus,
and contends that in large markets the ceteris paribus condition holds.
The second argument for counting only consumers’ ideal preferences
is more directly utilitarian. It claims, simply, that the preferences a util-
itarian should sum must be worth summing. There can be considerable
controversy as to which preferences belong in the appropriately summ-
able set, but no one has successfully argued for the inclusion of irrational
preferences.
4.3. Policy Responses
Section 1.2 suggested that banning naive contracts is problematic. A
naive contract reflects a mismatch between a consumer’s type and the
contract she prefers. Consumer types are difficult for decision makers
to observe, however, and so what appear to be mismatches may not be.
For example, a narrow warranty may be preferred by a consumer in
consequence of her excessive optimism or overconfidence, but it also
may be preferred by a sophisticated consumer who has an opportunity
to self-insure. Similarly, a credit card contract that requires no initial
payment, whose rate increases with time, and that has harsh default fees
may reflect a mismatch if bought by a consumer with excessive present-
based preferences or an unstable employment situation. The same con-
tract may be appropriate for a sophisticated consumer who correctly
23. The view that persons hold altruistic preferences in economic environments seems
based largely on play in experimental demand games, in which demanders choose a smaller
share of the sum the players are to divide than the payoff a demander’s power in the game
could command. Competing explanations of the phenomenon exist, however. The demander
knows the payoff of the other player and knows that she can entirely determine that payoff.
That the demander has perfect knowledge and complete power supports either of two
inferences about her behavior: the demander is altruistic or she fears rejection of greedy
offers. Schmitt (2004) and Bandiera, Baranky, and Rasul (2005) support the latter inter-
pretation, as does Camerer (2003, p. 115), who summarizes studies showing that when
persons play market games, where they do not know other players’ payoffs and cannot
affect those payoffs, persons maximize their own utility. In another vein, Brenner and Vriend
(2006) argue that demanders’ proposals are high because it takes them a very long time
to learn what the expected-payoff-maximizing offer is. The most recent real-world study
apparently is List (2006, pp. 5–6), which reports that “though the data collected from one-
shot laboratory experiments suggest that social preferences are quite important among the
agents, parallel treatments in the field suggest that such effects have minimal influence in
naturally occurring transactions.”
154 / T H E J O U R N A L O F L E G A L S T U D I E S / V O L U M E 3 7 ( 1 ) / J A N U A R Y 2 0 0 8
expects to borrow little and to repay promptly. In addition, naive con-
tracts may be good buys for everyone when they are competitively priced
and the better contracts are priced monopolistically. This reasoning sug-
gests that banning contracts is unlikely to be Pareto improving.
A market is performing badly, however, when identical contracts
trade at widely different prices. For example, if Xs trades at both and
∗ps
ls, then an insufficient number of consumers comparison shop. The two
standard remedies to facilitate comparison shopping are to require com-
mon terms in consumer contracts to be cast in standard forms, which
will facilitate comparisons, and to require the language in those forms
to be accessible to the average reader, which will increase comprehension
and thus probably increase the perceived need to shop. Both remedies
are in insufficient use today.
A third market-improving response is to respond directly to the pos-
sible existence of bias. For example, a credit card company could be
required to present consumers with a short description of default rates
together with a statement that not every borrower can be above average
(that consumers are better advised to consider themselves average than
good). Because some persons are better able to absorb narrative than
to evaluate statistics, an alternative disclosure mode would require firms
to provide consumers with scenario information: stories about persons
who rolled up excessive late fees or who incurred so much debt that
bankruptcy became their best option. Either form of disclosure could
reduce consumer naivete by moderating any overconfidence bias.24 State-
supplied workshops on good lending and purchasing behavior may be
helpful.25 Finally, actively involving consumers in a task, such as by
requiring them to answer questions about the task before performing it,
improves their ability to process relevant information (Natter and Barry
2005).26 When naivete falls, market performance improves.
A less promising policy response is to attempt directly to correct
disadvantaging biases. Apart from consumer education in schools, this
response is difficult to implement. Because biases may offset, the task
of bias correction makes great informational demands on the decision
maker. As an example, persons who overweight the present may choose
24. Jolls and Sunstein (2006) discuss the need for and the potential efficacy of providing
consumers with information of this type.
25. Bertrand, Mullainathan, and Shafer (2006) provide helpful suggestions along this
line.
26. Whether it will be practical often to involve consumers in purchasing tasks seems
unknown.
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suboptimal effort levels when pursuing projects with delayed payoffs. A
person who is excessively confident in her ability to control outcomes,
however, may overcome this bad incentive if her misplaced optimism
causes her to overrate the probability of success (Besharov 2004).27 When
offsetting errors are welfare enhancing, correcting one error must be
welfare reducing. This suggests that the task of bias correction is best
conducted holistically. In addition, many people use self-protective strat-
egies that sometimes work but also may over- or undershoot the mark.28
This situation, too, can make the directionality of error difficult for
decision makers to assess and thus complicates the task of correction.
It may be easier to improve markets than people.
REFERENCES
Agarwal, Sumit, Souphala Chomsisengphet, Chunlin Liu, and Nicholas S. Sou-
leles. 2006. Do Consumers Choose the Right Credit Contract? Working Paper
No. 2006-11. Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, Chicago.
Agarwal, Sumit, John C. Driscoll, Xavier Gabaix, and David Laibson. 2008.
27. Consistent with this view, more optimistic people work harder (Puri and Robinson
2007), and overconfidence helps to overcome anxiety about whether one can do a task
(Compte and Postlewaite 2004). Also, overconfidence may flaw performance in financial
markets, but many persons adopt protective personal strategies that permit them to do
well (Biais et al. 2005). Similarly, pessimistic consumers who make overly high projections
of future consumption needs may not undersave (Rabin 1999), and the self-serving bias,
to the extent it exists, may be adaptive (Kaplan and Ruffle 2004). See also Krueger and
Funder (2004, p. 319): “As soon as one asks whether changes in one bias may result in
changes in others, one moves toward a more comprehensive model.”
28. Persons sometimes attempt to overcome biases through internal systems of control.
For example, considerable evidence exists that a person forms her self-image by inducting
the kind of person she is from her past actions. Because persons have imperfect recall (they
cannot fully evaluate the wisdom of past choices), they develop personal rules to guide
behavior. It is easier to recall whether one violated a rule. The cost to a person of violating
a rule may be large: missing a scheduled exercise day will reduce fitness only by a little
but may contribute substantially to the person’s view that she actually is slothful (Kim
2006). For evidence that persons respond to this concern by creating personal rules, and
then may adhere to these rules too rigidly, see Soman and Cheema (2004). Relevant here
is their evidence that persons who fear they suffer from weakness of will may develop
savings rules that they are reluctant to break. Benabou and Tirole (2004, p. 850, emphasis
in original) formalize this idea in a model that shows, among other things, “that agents
with hyperbolic discounting can actually behave as though they overweighed the future
rather than the present.” Persons also use mental accounting, assigning expenses to separate
categories and keeping budgets for each category. This strategy, too, can ameliorate weak-
ness of will but may yield either rigidities or, when an expense can be assigned to more
than one category, strategic overspending (Cheema and Soman 2006).
156 / T H E J O U R N A L O F L E G A L S T U D I E S / V O L U M E 3 7 ( 1 ) / J A N U A R Y 2 0 0 8
Learning in the Credit Card Market. NBER Working Paper No. W13822.
National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, Mass.
Agnew, Julie R. 2006. Do Behavioral Biases Vary across Individuals? Evidence
from Individual Level 401(k) Data. Journal of Financial and Quantitative
Analysis 41:939–62.
Akerlof, George A., and Janet L. Yellen. 1985. Can Small Deviations from Ra-
tionality Make Significant Differences to Economic Equilibria? American
Economic Review 75:708–20.
Albrecht, James, Pieter A. Gautier, and Susan Vroman. 2006. Equilibrium Di-
rected Search with Multiple Applications. Review of Economic Studies 73:
869–91.
al-Nowaihi, Ali, and Sanjit Dhami. 2006. A Note on the Lowenstein-Prelec
Theory of Intertemporal Choice. Mathematical Social Sciences 52:99–108.
Ausubel, Lawrence M. 1991. The Failure of Competition in the Credit Card
Market. American Economic Review 81:50–81.
Bandiera, Oriana, Iwan Barankay, and Imran Rasul. 2005. Social Preferences
and the Response to Incentives: Evidence from Personal Data. Quarterly
Journal of Economics 120:917–62.
Benabou, Roland, and Jean Tirole. 2004. Willpower and Personal Rules. Journal
of Political Economy 112:848–86.
Bertrand, Marianne, Sendhil Mullainathan, and Eldar Shafer. 2006. Behavioral
Economics and Marketing in Aid of Decision Making among the Poor. Jour-
nal of Public Policy and Marketing 25:8–23.
Besharov, Gregory. 2004. Second-Best Considerations in Correcting Cognitive
Biases. Southern Economic Journal 71:12–20.
Biais, Bruno, Denis Hilton, Karine Mazurier, and Sebastian Pouget. 2005. Judg-
mental Overconfidence, Self-Monitoring, and Trading Performance in an Ex-
perimental Financial Market. Review of Economic Studies 72:287–312.
Brenner, Thomas, and Nicolaas J. Vriend. 2006. On the Behavior of Proposers
in Ultimatum Games. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 61:
617–31.
Brown, Tom, and Lacey Plache. 2006. Playing with Plastic: Maybe Not So Crazy.
University of Chicago Law Review 73:63–86.
Calem, Paul S., Michael B. Gordy, and Loretta J. Mester. 2006. Switching Costs
and Adverse Selection in the Market for Credit Cards: New Evidence. Journal
of Banking and Finance 30:1653–85.
Camerer, Colin F. 1990. Do Markets Correct Biases in Probability Judgment?
Evidence from Market Experiments. Pp. 126–72 in Advances in Behavioral
Economics, edited by Leonard Green and John Kagel. Norwood, N.J.: Ablex.
———. 2003. Behavioral Game Theory. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University
Press.
Campbell, John Y. 2006. Household Finance. Journal of Finance 61:1553–1604.
Cason, Timothy A., and Shakun Datta. 2006. An Experimental Study of Price
I R R AT I O N A L I T Y I N T H E M A R K E T / 157
Dispersion in an Optimal Search Model with Advertising. International Jour-
nal of Industrial Organization 24:639–65.
Cheema, Amar, and Dilip Soman. 2006. Malleable Mental Accounting: The
Effect of Flexibility on the Justification of Attractive Spending and Con-
sumption Decisions. Journal of Consumer Psychology 16:33–44.
Chiappe, Dan, and Kevin MacDonald. 2005. The Evolution of Domain-General
Mechanisms in Intelligence and Learning. Journal of General Psychology
132:5–40.
Compte, Oliver, and Andrew Postlewaite. 2004. Confidence-Enhanced Perfor-
mance. American Economic Review 94:1536–57.
Dasgupta, Partha, and Eric Maskin. 2005. Uncertainty and Hyperbolic Dis-
counting. American Economic Review 95:1290–99.
DellaVigna, Stefano, and Ulrike Malmendier. 2004. Contract Design and Self-
Control: Theory and Evidence. Quarterly Journal of Economics 119:
353–402.
Einav, Liran. 2005. Informational Asymmetries and Observational Learning in
Search. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 30:241–59.
Frederick, Shane, George Lowenstein, and Ted O’Donaghue. 2002. Time Dis-
counting and Time Preference: A Critical Review. Journal of Economic Lit-
erature 40:351–401.
Gabaix, Xavier, and David Laibson. 2006. Shrouded Attributes, Consumer My-
opia, and Information Suppression in Competitive Markets. Quarterly Jour-
nal of Economics 121:505–40.
Garcı´a, Diego, Francesco Sangiorgi, and Branko Urosˇevic´. 2007. Overconfi-
dence and Market Efficiency with Heterogenous Agents. Economic Theory
30:313–36.
Grether, David, Alan Schwartz, and Louis Wilde. 1992. Price, Quality, and Tim-
ing of Moves in Markets with Incomplete Information: An Experimental
Analysis. Economic Journal 102:754–71.
Harrison, Glenn W. 1994. Expected Utility Theory and the Experimentalists.
Empirical Economics 19:223–53.
Jolls, Christine, and Cass R. Sunstein. 2006. Debiasing through Law. Journal of
Legal Studies 35:199–241.
Kahneman, Daniel. 2003. Maps of Bounded Rationality: Psychology for Behav-
ioral Economics. American Economic Review 92:1449–76.
Kaplan, Todd R., and Bradley J. Ruffle. 2004. The Self-Serving Bias and Beliefs
about Rationality. Economic Inquiry 42:237–46.
Kim, Jeong-Yoo. 2006. Hyperbolic Discounting and the Repeated Self-Control
Problem. Journal of Economic Psychology 27:344–59.
Kim, Taehyung, Lucia F. Dunn, and Gene Mumy. 2005. Bank Competition and
Consumer Search over Credit Card Interest Rates. Economic Inquiry 43:
344–53.
Kluger, Brian D., and Steve R. Wyatt. 2004. Are Judgment Errors Reflected in
158 / T H E J O U R N A L O F L E G A L S T U D I E S / V O L U M E 3 7 ( 1 ) / J A N U A R Y 2 0 0 8
Market Prices and Allocations? Experimental Evidence Based on the Monty
Hall Problem. Journal of Finance 59:969–97.
Krueger, Joachim I., and David C. Funder. 2004. Toward a Balanced Social
Psychology: Causes, Consequences, and Cures for the Problem-Seeking Ap-
proach to Social Behavior and Cognition. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27:
313–27.
List, John A. 2003. Does Market Experience Eliminate Market Anomalies?
Quarterly Journal of Economics 118:41–71.
———. 2006. The Behavioralist Meets the Market: Measuring Social Preferences
and Reputation Effects in Actual Transactions. Journal of Political Economy
114:1–37.
Morgan, John, Henrik Orzen, and Martin Sefton. 2006. An Experimental Study
of Price Dispersion. Games and Economic Behavior 54:134–58.
Natter, Hedwig M., and Dianne C. Barry. 2005. Effects of Active Information
Processing on the Understanding of Risk Information. Journal of Applied
Cognitive Psychology 19:123–35.
Puri, Manju, and David T. Robinson. 2007. Optimism and Economic Choice.
Journal of Financial Economics 86:71–99.
Rabin, Matthew. 1999. Comment. P. 247 in Behavioral Dimensions of Retire-
ment Economics, edited by Henry Aaron. Washington, D.C.: Brookings In-
stitution Press and Russell Sage Foundation.
Rachlinski, Jeffrey J. 2006. Cognitive Errors, Individual Differences, and Pater-
nalism. University of Chicago Law Review 73:207–29.
Ronnlund Michael, Erik Karlsonn, Erica Laggnas, Lisa Larsson, and Therese
Lindstrom. 2005. Risky Decision Making across Three Areas of Choice: Are
Younger and Older Adults Differently Subject to Framing Effects? Journal
of General Psychology 132:81–92.
Rydval, Ondrej, and Andreas Ortmann. 2004. How Financial Incentives and
Cognitive Abilities Affect Task Performance in Laboratory Settings: An Il-
lustration. Economics Letters 85:315–20.
Salop, Stephen, and Joseph Stiglitz. 1977. Bargains and Ripoffs: A Model of
Monopolistically Competitive Price Dispersion. Review of Economic Studies
44:493–510.
Schmitt, Pamela M. 2004. On Perceptions of Fairness: The Role of Valuations,
Outside Options, and Information in Ultimatum Bargaining Games. Exper-
imental Economics 7:49–73.
Shui, Haiyan, and Lawrence M. Ausubel. 2005. Time Inconsistency in the Credit
Card Market. Unpublished manuscript. University of Maryland, Department
of Economics, January.
Soman, Dilip, and Amar Cheema. 2004. When Goals Are Counterproductive:
The Effects of Violation of a Behavioral Goal on Subsequent Performance.
Journal of Consumer Research 31:52–62.
I R R AT I O N A L I T Y I N T H E M A R K E T / 159
Sonnemans, Joep. 1998. Strategies of Search. Journal of Economic Behavior and
Organization 35:309–32.
Stanovich, Keith E. 1999. Who Is Rational? Studies of Individual Differences
in Reasoning. Mahwah, N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum.
Stanovich, Keith E., and Richard F. West. 2000. Individual Differences in Human
Reasoning: Implications for the Rationality Debate. Behavioral and Brain
Sciences 23:645–65.
Strack, Fritz, Lioba Werth, and Roland Deutch. 2004. Reflective and Impulsive
Determinants of Social Behavior. Personality and Social Psychology Review
8:220–47.
Van den Steen, Eric. 2004. Rational Overoptimism (and Other Biases). American
Economic Review 94:1141–51.
Williams, Bernard. 1985. Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy. Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Yang, Sha, Livia Markoczy, and Min Qi. 2007. Unrealistic Optimism in Con-
sumer Credit Card Adoption. Journal of Economic Psychology 28:170–85.
